Measuring the Intentional World: Realism, Naturalism, and Quantitative Methods in the Behavioral Sciences

OUP Usa (1998)
Scientific realism has been advanced as an interpretation of the natural sciences but never as an interpretation of the behavioural sciences. This book introduces a novel version of scientific realism -- Measured Realism -- that characterizes the kind of theoretical progress in the social and psychological sciences that is uneven but indisputable. Measuring the Intentional World proposes a theory of measurement -- Population-Guided Estimation -- that connects natural, psychological, and social scientific inquiry
Keywords Psychology   Social sciences   Realism
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ISBN(s) 9780195107661   0195107667
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Erik Angner (2013). Is It Possible to Measure Happiness? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):221-240.

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