Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge

Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366 (2011)
Abstract
In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential
Keywords Ethics  Intuitionism  Intuition  Moral knowledge  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
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    References found in this work BETA
    Michael Huemer (2008). Revisionary Intuitionism. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
    Keith Allen Korez (1997). Recent Work on the Basing Relation. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2):171 - 191.

    View all 11 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Robert Cowan (2013). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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