David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366 (2011)
In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential
|Keywords||Ethics Intuitionism Intuition Moral knowledge Walter Sinnott-Armstrong|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Huemer (2008). Revisionary Intuitionism. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
Keith Allen Korez (1997). Recent Work on the Basing Relation. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2):171 - 191.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Cowan (2013). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1).
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