Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge

Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366 (2011)
In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential
Keywords Ethics  Intuitionism  Intuition  Moral knowledge  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0126-0
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,280
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Robert Cowan (2015). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Bart Streumer (2003). Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'? European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228.
Mark van Roojen (forthcoming). Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments. In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press
Elizabeth Tropman (2009). Renewing Moral Intuitionism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

104 ( #43,221 of 1,932,455 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #225,373 of 1,932,455 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.