David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165 (2009)
A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call ‘fine-grained reductionism’, a particular version of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to the debate about physicalism than one may have thought.
|Keywords||Physicalism Sparse ontology Monism Pluralism Intrinsicality Realization Distribution Ontological dependence|
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References found in this work BETA
J. A. Fodor (1974). Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis). Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):149-63.
Jaegwon Kim (1992). Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
Jaegwon Kim (2002). The Layered Model: Metaphysical Considerations. Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):2 – 20.
Citations of this work BETA
Einar Duenger Bohn (2012). Monism, Emergence, and Plural Logic. Erkenntnis 76 (2):211-223.
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