“ S Knows that p ” Expanded: Apology 20 d-24 b

Social Epistemology 24 (1):29-43 (2011)
Abstract
There are calls to expand the schema “ S knows that p ” to accommodate ways of knowing that are socially important but neglected in recent epistemology. A wider, more adequate conception of human knowing is needed that will include interested or motivated inquirers as “S,” and personal traits of persons as “ p .” Historically important treatments of knowing that accommodate these features deserve examination as part of the effort to create a broader epistemology. We find such a treatment of knowing in Plato's Apology , 20 d-24 b, in which Socrates claims a bit of wisdom. We attend more carefully than others have to the concrete aspects of Socrates' encounters with interlocutors
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Gilbert Ryle (1966). Plato's Progress. Cambridge, Cambridge U.P..

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Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
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