Dummett's Notion of Implicit Knowledge
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Writings 24:17-35 (2003)
In this paper I evaluate Michael Dummett’s notion of implicit knowledge by examining his answers to these two questions: (1) Why should we ascribe knowledge of a meaning-theory of a language to a language-user, and why the mode of this knowledge is implicit, but not pure theoretical, pure practical, or unconscious in a Chomskian sense? (2) How could a meaning-theory, which is known implicitly, function as a rule to be followed by the language-user? To answer (1) I shall construct Dummett’s argument for implicit knowledge, which includes three sub-arguments: the argument from rationality, the argument from dilemma, and the argument from communicability. As to (2), I argue that Dummett’s answer confuses knowledge of a meaning-theory with knowledge of a set of grammars.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mark Textor (2000). Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense. Theoria 15 (2):287-302.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2010). Practical Knowledge of Language. Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.
Patricia Hanna (2006). Swimming and Speaking Spanish. Philosophia 34 (3):267-285.
John P. Burgess (1984). Dummett's Case for Intuitionism. History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2):177-194.
Bernhard Weiss (2003). Knowledge of Meaning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):75–92.
Bernhard Weiss (2004). Knowledge of Meaning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):75 - 94.
John R. Vokey & Philip A. Higham (1999). Implicit Knowledge as Automatic, Latent Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):787-788.
Ofra Magidor (2007). Strict Finitism Refuted? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):403-411.
Robert F. Bornstein (1999). Unconscious Motivation and Phenomenal Knowledge: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Implicit Mental States. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):758-758.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2006). Can, or Should, Dummett Solve the Delivery Problem? Auslegung 28 (1):21-43.
Added to index2010-03-06
Total downloads37 ( #39,258 of 1,089,064 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,801 of 1,089,064 )
How can I increase my downloads?