Linguistic Know-How: The Limits of Intellectualism

Theoria 77 (1):71-86 (2011)
Abstract
In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn
Keywords knowledge-how  knowledge-that  practical ability  regress argument
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    Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
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