David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoria 77 (1):71-86 (2011)
In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn
|Keywords||knowledge-how knowledge-that practical ability regress argument|
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References found in this work BETA
Quassim Cassam (1989). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 98 (390):313-315.
Noam Chomsky (1988). Language and Problems of Knowledge. The Mit Press.
Donald Davidson (2005). Truth, Language and History. Oxford University Press.
Michael Devitt (2006). Ignorance of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
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