David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556 (2011)
Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by introducing and elaborating the concept of hybrid knowing-how, which entails a combination of a ground-level ability and a meta-level perspective on that ability. The stance I wish to advocate is that the epistemology of knowing-how is a normative discipline whose main task is to study the nature and value of human practical intelligence required to do things in a particular manner
|Keywords||metaepistemology knowledge-how consciousness normativity first person|
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Ryle (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Ernest Sosa (2007). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107-145.
Citations of this work BETA
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2014). The Structure of Practical Expertise. Philosophia 42 (2):539-554.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2015). Knowledge of Language in Action. Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):68-89.
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