David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Columbia Law Review 109:182 (2009)
Suppose two people commit the same crime and are sentenced to equal terms in the same prison facility. I argue that they have identical punishments in name only. One may experience incarceration as challenging but tolerable while the other is thoroughly tormented by it. Even though people vary substantially in their experiences of punishment, our sentencing laws pay little attention to such differences. I make two central claims: First, a successful justification of punishment must take account of offenders' subjective experiences when assessing punishment severity. Second, we have certain obligations to consider actual or anticipated punishment experience at sentencing, at least when we can do so in a cost-effective, administrable manner. Though it may seem impossible or prohibitively expensive to take punishment experience into account, we should not accept this excuse too quickly. In civil litigation, we often make assessments of emotional distress. Even if we cannot calibrate the punishments of individual offenders, we could enact broad policies that are better at taking punishment experience into account than those we have now. I do not argue that more sensitive offenders should receive shorter prison sentences than less sensitive offenders who commit crimes of equal blameworthiness. I do, however, argue that when they are given equal prison terms, more sensitive offenders receive harsher punishments than less sensitive offenders and that it is a mistake to believe that both kinds of offenders receive punishments proportional to their desert.
|Keywords||Punishment Subjective Experience Retributivism Consequentialism Neuroethics|
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Citations of this work BETA
Nicole A. Vincent (2010). On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):77-98.
Greg Roebuck & David Wood (2011). A Retributive Argument Against Punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (1):73-86.
Larry Alexander (2013). You Got What You Deserved. Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):309-319.
Stephen P. Garvey (2013). Was Ellen Wronged? Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):185-216.
Douglas Husak (2013). The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Extending the Debates. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):351-365.
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