David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):397-397 (1999)
Pylyshyn claims that if a system is cognitively penetrable, its function depends in a semantically coherent way to the organism's goals and beliefs. He rejects evidence of attentional modulation observed in neurons within the visual system, claiming that any modulation seen is not logically related to goals and behavior. I present some of this evidence and claim that it is connected in exactly the way Pylyshyn requires and thus it refutes his main thesis.
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