David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialogue 42 (3):573-598 (2003)
In "Dynamics of Reason" (2001), Michael Friedman advocates a neo-Kantian perspective for philosophy of science that addresses the problem of scientific change and opposes both Quine's naturalism and Kuhn's relativism. This critical notice of Friedman's book focuses on the "relativized a priori" principles articulated by Friedman. Friedman's arguments against Quine and Kuhn are subsequently evaluated. It is concluded that Friedman succeeds in illustrating deficiencies of Quine's naturalism, however, he fails to sufficiently establish a "rational" basis for theory-choice and, hence, his argument against Kuhn's "arational" view is unsuccessful.
|Keywords||Relativized a priori Scientific Change Michael Friedman Neo-Kantianism Rudolf Carnap Hans Reichenbach Thomas Kuhn W. V. Quine Naturalism Philosophy of Physics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Andrew Chignell (2008). NeoKantian Philosophies of Science: Cassirer, Kuhn, and Friedman. Philosophical Forum 39 (2):253-262.
Michael Friedman (2001). Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Csli Publications.
Edward Slowik, Spacetime and Structure: Structural Realism, Neo-Kantianism Idealism, or Relativized a Priorism?
Dan McArthur (2008). Theory Change, Structural Realism, and the Relativised a Priori. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):5 – 20.
Jonathan Y. Tsou (2010). Putnam's Account of Apriority and Scientific Change: Its Historical and Contemporary Interest. Synthese 176 (3):429-445.
Michael Friedman (2002). Kant, Kuhn, and the Rationality of Science. Philosophy of Science 69 (2):171-90.
Alan W. Richardson (2002). Narrating the History of Reason Itself: Friedman, Kuhn, and a Constitutive a Priori for the Twenty-First Century. Perspectives on Science 10 (3):253-274.
Thomas Mormann (2012). A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (1): 27 - 37.
Sami Pihlström & Arto Siitonen (2005). The Transcendental Method and (Post-)Empiricist Philosophy of Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (1):81 - 106.
Added to index2009-05-25
Total downloads63 ( #19,110 of 1,004,684 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,235 of 1,004,684 )
How can I increase my downloads?