A Role for Reason in Science

Dialogue 42 (3):573-598 (2003)
Abstract In "Dynamics of Reason" (2001), Michael Friedman advocates a neo-Kantian perspective for philosophy of science that addresses the problem of scientific change and opposes both Quine's naturalism and Kuhn's relativism. This critical notice of Friedman's book focuses on the "relativized a priori" principles articulated by Friedman. Friedman's arguments against Quine and Kuhn are subsequently evaluated. It is concluded that Friedman succeeds in illustrating deficiencies of Quine's naturalism, however, he fails to sufficiently establish a "rational" basis for theory-choice and, hence, his argument against Kuhn's "arational" view is unsuccessful.
Keywords Relativized a priori  Scientific Change  Michael Friedman  Neo-Kantianism  Rudolf Carnap  Hans Reichenbach  Thomas Kuhn  W. V. Quine  Naturalism  Philosophy of Physics
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