How to Forget that “Know” is Factive
Acta Analytica 27 (4):449-459 (2012)
| Abstract | This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive. | |||||||||
| Keywords | knowledge, analysis of factivity implicature | |||||||||
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