How to Forget that 'Know' is Factive

Acta Analytica 27 (4):449-459 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive.

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10.1007/s12136-012-0150-8

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Author's Profile

Savas L. Tsohatzidis
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (mirror)

Citations of this work

Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.

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References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Language: A Biological Model.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
The Myth of Factive Verbs.Allan Hazlett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497 - 522.

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