David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 176 (3):429-445 (2010)
In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship between the constitutive function of a priori principles and entrenchment.
|Keywords||Hilary Putnam W. V. Quine Michael Friedman William Wimsatt Relativized a priori Scientific Change Apriority History of Physics Entrenchment|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert DiSalle (2002). Reconsidering Kant, Friedman, Logical Positivism, and the Exact Sciences. Philosophy of Science 69 (2):191-211.
Gary Ebbs (1997). Rule-Following and Realism. Harvard University Press.
Michael Friedman (2001). Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Csli Publications.
Michael Friedman (1997). Philosophical Naturalism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 71 (2):5 - 21.
Michael Friedman (1999). Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge University Press.
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