David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 67 (1):17 - 27 (2007)
Galen Strawson has claimed that “the impossibility of free will and ultimate moral responsibility can be proved with complete certainty.” Strawson, I take it, thinks that this conclusion can be established by one argument which he has developed. In this argument, he claims that rational free actions would require an infinite regress of rational choices, which is, of course, impossible for human beings. In my paper, I argue that agent causation theorists need not be worried by Strawson’s argument. For agent causation theorists are able to deny a key principle which drives the regress. Oversimplifying things a bit, the principle states that if one is responsible for her rational actions, then she was antecedently responsible for the reasons on which she acted
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
Galen Strawson (1986/2010). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press.
Galen Strawson (1995). Libertarianism, Action, and Self-Determination. In Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Galen Strawson (2002). The Bounds of Freedom. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. 441-460.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Timothy O'Connor & John Ross Churchill (2004). Reasons Explanation and Agent Control: In Search of an Integrated Account. Philosophical Topics 32 (1):241.
Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2006). Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.
Vere Chappell (1994). Locke on the Freedom of the Will. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press. 101--21.
Hanoch Ben-Yami (2007). The Impossibility of Backwards Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):439–455.
Shaun Nichols (2004). The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts. Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.
Meghan Griffith (2007). Freedom and Trying: Understanding Agent-Causal Exertions. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
Michael Anthony Istvan (2011). Concerning the Resilience of Galen Strawson's Basic Argument. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):399-420.
Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.
Eric Marcus (2012). Rational Causation. Harvard University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads79 ( #16,709 of 1,101,075 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #81,399 of 1,101,075 )
How can I increase my downloads?