David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialogue 45 (04):627-46 (2006)
It is commonly assumed, at least by continental philosophers, that epistemological hermeneutics and foundationalism are incompatible. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. If I am correct, the analytic and continental traditions may be closer than is commonly supposed. Hermeneutics, as I will argue, is a descriptive claim about human cognition, and foundationalism is a normative claim about how beliefs ought to be related to one another. Once the positions are stated in this way, their putative incompatibility vanishes. Also, to inspire further research I include an appendix which contains an unfinished prototype of a hermeneutic foundationalism.
|Keywords||foundationalism hermeneutics continental epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976). Philosophical Hermeneutics. University of California Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
David Novitz (2000). Interpretation and Justification. Metaphilosophy 31 (1-2):4-24.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford University Press.
Tom Rockmore (1990). Epistemology As Hermeneutics. The Monist 73 (2):115-133.
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