David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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OUP USA (2007)
The neural structures of the brain exist to construct information. They do this by creating concepts that relate internal, personal need to external, environmental reality. Meaning is formed in the brain by neural network patterns that traverse these two structures of experience: the visceral nervous system (representing personal need) and the somatic nervous system (interfacing with external reality). How exactly does the brain get from constructing information to creating meaning, and what can this process tell us about the nature of experience? This book addresses both of these questions, making an important contribution to both neuroscience and philosophy.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Johnson (2011). There is No Moral Faculty. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):409 - 432.
Robert Lickliter (2008). Representing Development: Models, Meaning, and the Challenge of Complexity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):342-343.
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