David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340 (2012)
Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, I argue that this higher-level awareness needn’t be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn’t be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification
|Keywords||Inferential justification Higher-level requirements Internalism Externalism Fumerton Awareness Subject’s perspective Inferential internalism|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Richard A. Fumerton (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Rowman & Littlefield.
Michael Huemer (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Citations of this work BETA
Chris Tucker (2014). If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too. Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.
Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1271-1290.
Kevin McCain (2013). Explanationist Evidentialism. Episteme 10 (3):299-315.
Logan Paul Gage (2016). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject’s Perspective Objection. Acta Analytica 31 (1):43-58.
Hans Muller & Bana Bashour (2011). Why Alief is Not a Legitimate Psychological Category. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:371-389.
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