Movin' on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification

Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340 (2012)
Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, I argue that this higher-level awareness needn’t be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn’t be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification
Keywords Inferential justification  Higher-level requirements  Internalism  Externalism  Fumerton  Awareness  Subject’s perspective  Inferential internalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9650-9
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,201
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Michael Bergmann (2005). Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
Chris Tucker (2011). No Justified Higher-Level Belief, No Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:283-290.
M. Huemer (2002). Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:329--340.
Elijah Chudnoff (2014). The Rational Roles of Intuition. In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press
David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

125 ( #34,191 of 1,940,950 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

20 ( #30,351 of 1,940,950 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.