Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default

As I use the term, ‘entitlement’ is any warrant one has by default—i.e. without acquiring it. Some philosophers not only affirm the existence of entitlement, but also give it a crucial role in the justification of our perceptual beliefs. These philosophers affirm the Entitlement Thesis: An essential part of what makes our perceptual beliefs justified is our entitlement to the proposition that I am not a brain-in-a-vat. Crispin Wright, Stewart Cohen, and Roger White are among those who endorse this controversial claim. In this paper, I argue that the Entitlement Thesis is false.
Keywords warrant  entitlement  Crispin Wright  perceptual justification  non-inferential justification  Stewart Cohen
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    References found in this work BETA
    Michael Bergmann (2005). Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Martin Smith (2013). Entitlement and Evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.
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    Crispin Wright & Martin Davies (2004). On Epistemic Entitlement. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167 - 245.
    Albert Casullo (2007). What is Entitlement? Acta Analytica 22 (4):267 - 279.
    Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.
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