Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63 (2009)
|Abstract||As I use the term, ‘entitlement’ is any warrant one has by default—i.e. without acquiring it. Some philosophers not only affirm the existence of entitlement, but also give it a crucial role in the justification of our perceptual beliefs. These philosophers affirm the Entitlement Thesis: An essential part of what makes our perceptual beliefs justified is our entitlement to the proposition that I am not a brain-in-a-vat. Crispin Wright, Stewart Cohen, and Roger White are among those who endorse this controversial claim. In this paper, I argue that the Entitlement Thesis is false.|
|Keywords||warrant entitlement Crispin Wright perceptual justification non-inferential justification Stewart Cohen|
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