David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411 (2011)
We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly accepted methods for dealing with the logical paradoxes.
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
W. C. Kneale (1962/1984). The Development of Logic. Oxford University Press.
Jon Barwise (1987). The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press.
George Bealer (1982). Quality and Concept. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Nolan (forthcoming). Conditionals and Curry. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
Peter Fritz (2014). What is the Correct Logic of Necessity, Actuality and Apriority? Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):385-414.
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