Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism
Chris Tucker (ed.)
Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism. In C. Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oxford University Press.
Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Seemings and Justification: An Introduction. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press.
Chris Tucker (2010). Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
Chris Tucker (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology. In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press.
Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30-55.
Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
Matthew Skene (forthcoming). Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies.
Paul Silva (forthcoming). How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Michael Huemer (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.
T. Ryan Byerly (2012). It Seems Like There Aren't Any Seemings. Philosophia 40 (4):771-782.
Matthew Kotzen (2012). Silins's Liberalism. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):61-68.
John M. DePoe (2011). Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
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