David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Res Publica 18 (3):225-240 (2012)
It is common to encounter the criticism that Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority is flawed because it appears to justify too much. This essay examines the extent to which the service conception accommodates this critique. Two variants of this critical strategy are considered. The first, exemplified by Kenneth Einar Himma, alleges that the service conception fails to conceptualize substantive limits on the legitimate exercise of authority. This variant fails; Raz has elucidated substantive limits on jurisdiction within the service conception of authority, albeit reluctantly and equivocally. The second, exemplified by Scott Hershovitz, alleges that the service conception fails to conceptualize procedural limits on the legitimate exercise of authority. He objects that the normal justification thesis fails to deny legitimacy to rational and expert dictators. This argument is more potent, but its force is concealed when it is aimed at the normal justification thesis rather than the quite separate jurisdictional limits of Raz’s theory. Clarifying those jurisdictional aspects of the service conception shows why the first argument fails and exposes the real strength of the second. Both variants have important consequences for our understanding of the service conception
|Keywords||Authority Legitimacy Joseph Raz Democracy|
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References found in this work BETA
Samantha Besson (2005). Review Article: Democracy, Law and Authority. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (1):89-99.
Tom Christiano, Democracy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
T. Endicott (2005). The Subsidiarity of Law and the Obligation to Obey. American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 (1):233-248.
Scott Hershovitz (2003). Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority. Legal Theory 9 (3):201-220.
Kenneth Einar Himma (2007). Just 'Cause You're Smarter Than Me Doesn't Give You a Right to Tell Me What to Do: Legitimate Authority and the Normal Justification Thesis. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (1):121-150.
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