David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 59 (1):102-119 (1992)
The fundamental problem of what is explained in science should be considered and clarified since it determines the way of solving the problem of how something is explained as well as the entire view of explanation. In the first section after the introduction, Hempel's models of explanation are criticized for their narrow concern with logical reconstruction. In the next section a broader epistemological approach to explanation is presented, and in the last section an historical example of Newtonian explanation as epistemic activity is discussed
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