Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism

Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545 (2010)
Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because it allows a seeming to provide justification even if the seeming was caused in some apparently inappropriate way. I conclude by disarming this objection.
Keywords dogmatism  phenomenal conservatism  speckled hen problem  perceptual justification  blindsight  associative visual agnosia  seemings
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00202.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

239 ( #4,361 of 1,725,424 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

30 ( #34,378 of 1,725,424 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.