Why Sceptical Theism isn’t Sceptical Enough
In Trent Doughtery & Justin McBrayder (eds.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
| Abstract | The most common charge against sceptical theism is that it is too sceptical, i.e. it committed to some undesirable form of scepticism or another. I contend that Michael Bergmann’s sceptical theism isn’t sceptical enough. I argue that, if true, the sceptical theses secure a genuine victory: they prevent, for some people, a prominent argument from evil from providing any justification whatsoever to doubt the existence of God. On the other hand, even if true, the sceptical theses fail to prevent even the atheist from justifiably accepting it. | |||||||||
| Keywords | skeptical theism argument from evil non-inferential justification | |||||||||
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