Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):101-114 (2011)
|Abstract||G. H. von Wright proposed that a temporal interval exemplifies a real contradiction if at least one part of any division of this interval involves the presence of contradictorily related (though non-simultaneous) states. In connection with intervals, two negations must be discerned: 'does not hold at an interval' and 'fails throughout an interval'. Von Wright did not distinguish the two. As a consequence, he made a mistake in indicating how to use his logical symbolism to express the notion of real contradiction. The present paper aims to reconstruct and philosophically motivate von Wright's argument for the possibility of real contradictions.|
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