Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief

Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628 (2011)
The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do competing accounts of belief
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01432.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,890
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Keith Frankish (2009). Delusions: A Two-Level Framework. In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 269--284.
A. W. Young (1999). Delusions. The Monist 82 (4):571-589.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

24 ( #122,592 of 1,725,413 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #211,008 of 1,725,413 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.