How philosophers think about persons, personal identity, and the self
In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press (2009)
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