David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137 (2000)
In this paper the problem of the relation between belief and acceptance is discussed in view of recent literature on the topic. Belief and acceptance are characterized in terms of a number of properties, which show both the similarities and the dissimilarities between these notions. In particular it is claimed - contrary to some recently expressed views - that acceptance need not be intentional action and that the differences between belief and acceptance do not boil down to the simple view that acceptance, contrary to belief, is based on the agent's direct exercise of his will. Acceptance which is not based on intentional action is shown in the paper to be especially closely related to belief, especially to linguistic belief. Thus if a person is in a non-intentional-ly acquired and held state of acceptance that something p, he also believes that p. Another general difference is that acceptance is language-dependent while there can be non-linguistic belief. Collective beliefs and acceptances are also briefly discussed in the paper Among other things, it is noted that the notion of wide as contrasted with truth-oriented, narrow acceptance is central in the collective case.
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References found in this work BETA
Raimo Tuomela (1995). The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford University Press.
Robert N. Audi (1994). Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
Keith Lehrer (1997). Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
Pascal Engel (1998). Believing, Holding True, and Accepting. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.
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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Mandelbaum (2013). Thinking is Believing. Inquiry 57 (1):55-96.
Richard Dub (2015). Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
Thomas Szanto (2014). How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
Kay Mathiesen (2006). The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. Episteme 2 (3):161-175.
Raimo Tuomela (2004). Group Knowledge Analyzed. Episteme 1 (2):109-127.
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