Collective Acceptance and Social Reality

Many social properties and notions are collectively made. Two collectively created aspects of the social world have been emphasized in recent literature. The first is that of the performative character of many social things (entities, properties). The second is the reflexive nature of many social concepts. The present account adds to this list a third feature, the collective availability or “for-groupness” of collective social items. It is a precise account of social notions and social facts in terms of collective appearance. The collective acceptance account has ontological implications in that it accepts mind-independent, group-dependent, and simply mind-dependent social facts
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DOI 10.5840/wcp2020011137
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Raimo Tuomela (2000). Belief Versus Acceptance. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137.

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Raimo Tuomela (2000). Belief Versus Acceptance. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137.

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