David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 56 (March):23-47 (1989)
This paper is a discussion of the tenability of methodological solipsism, which typically relies on the so-called Explanatory Thesis. The main arguments in the paper are directed against the latter thesis, according to which internal (or autonomous or narrow) psychological states as opposed to noninternal ones suffice for explanation in psychology. Especially, feedback-based actions are argued to require indispensable reference to noninternal explanantia, often to explanatory common causes. Thus, to the extent that methodological solipsism is taken to require the truth of the Explanatory Thesis, it, too, can be regarded as untenable
|Keywords||Explanation Psychology Science Solipsism Supervenience|
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Citations of this work BETA
Raimo Tuomela (1989). Collective Action, Supervenience, and Constitution. Synthese 80 (2):243 - 266.
J. Brakel (1996). Interdiscourse or Supervenience Relations: The Primacy of the Manifest Image. Synthese 106 (2):253 - 297.
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