On the structural aspects of collective action and free-riding

Theory and Decision 32 (2):165-202 (1992)
1. One of the main aims of this paper is to study the possibilities for free-riding type of behavior in various kinds of many-person interaction situations. In particular it will be of interest to see what kinds of game-theoretic structures, defined in terms of the participants' outcome-preferences, can be involved in cases of free-riding. I shall also be interested in the related problem or dilemma of collective action in a somewhat broader sense. By the dilemma of collective action I mean, generally speaking, the conflict between individual and collective rationality and the conflict between corresponding actions, in the sense it has been discussed in recent literature. Typically (although not invariably) collective action problems and free-rider problems coexist. Let me start my discussion by considering what Elster (1985) has to say about the subject. First, the notion of collective action itself should be characterized. Elster defines it as follows (p. 137): "By collective action I mean the choice by all or most individuals of the course of action that, when chosen by all or most individuals, leads to the collectively best outcome." While this characterization is informative in the present context, I think that it is not appropriate as a general characterization. It may provide a sufficient condition, but it fails as a necessary condition. One reason for this is that there may not be a single collectively best outcome at all. Instead, I suggest we follow common sense and take collective action simply to be action by a collection or group of people, where these people (or at least many of them) act with the aim of achieving a common end or goal (this notion understood very broadly so as to include e.g. following norms, practices, and customs). We also require of a situation of collective action that the participants have several (or at least two) possible courses of action open to them. Elster's above definition of collective action goes in terms of the collectively best outcome or goal.
Keywords Collective action dilemma  free-riding  three-person game
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DOI 10.1007/BF00134050
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References found in this work BETA
Raimo Tuomela (1991). We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group-Intentions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):249-277.

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Citations of this work BETA
Garrett Cullity (1995). Moral Free Riding. Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1):3–34.
Garrett Cullity (1995). Moral Free Riding. Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1):3-34.

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