David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Wiley (1996)
In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; 4) social norms and social institutions (see Tuomela, 1984, 1995). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from Human Computer Interaction, Computer-Supported Cooperative Work, Organizational Processing, Distributed Problem Solving to Simulation of Social Systems and Organizations. Even if I am a philosopher with low artificial intelligence I will below try to say something about what the scope of DAI should be taken to be on conceptual and philosophical grounds. (In the later sections of the paper the central notion of joint intention will be the main topic - in order to illustrate how philosophers and DAI-researchers approach this issue.) Let us now consider the relationship between philosophy - especially philosophy of social action - and DAI. Both are concerned with social matters and in this sense seem to have a connection to social science proper. What kinds of questions should these areas of study be concerned with? In principle, ordinary social science should study all aspects of social life (in various societies and cultures), try to describe it and create general theories to explain it.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa (forthcoming). Mixed Motives in the Equilibrium View of Joint Intention. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Raimo Tuomela (2000). Collective and Joint Intention. Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.
Similar books and articles
Cristiano Castelfranchi (2000). Through the Agents' Minds: Cognitive Mediators of Social Action. Mind and Society 1 (1):109-140.
Maurits Kaptein, Panos Markopoulos, Boris Ruyter & Emile Aarts (2011). Two Acts of Social Intelligence: The Effects of Mimicry and Social Praise on the Evaluation of an Artificial Agent. [REVIEW] AI and Society 26 (3):261-273.
Celia Brownell (2011). Early Developments in Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
Seumas Miller (2001). Social Action: A Teleological Account. Cambridge University Press.
Margaret P. Gilbert (2001). Sociality, Unity, Objectivity. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 11:153-160.
Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski & Kaarlo Miller (eds.) (2003). Realism in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Deborah Tollefsen (2005). Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Gabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela (1995). Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise. Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
Raimo Tuomela (1995). The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #100,267 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #289,836 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?