David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford University Press (1995)
This book develops a systematic philosophical theory of social action and group phenomena, in the process presenting detailed analyses of such central social notions as 'we-attitude' (especially 'we-intention' and mutual belief, social norm, joint action, and - most important - group goal, group belief, and group action). Though this is a philosophical work, it presents a unified conceptual framework that may be useful to social scientists, especially social psychologists, as well as philosophers. The book puts forward and defends a number of systematic philosophical theses, resulting in not only a theory of social action but, more broadly, a philosophical theory of society, or at least those aspects of society with which social psychology is supposed to deal (individuals in groups, groups, joint action, and the like).
|Keywords||Social sciences Philosophy|
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|Buy the book||$2000.00 used $2000.00 new Amazon page|
|Call number||H61.T96 1995|
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Citations of this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (2004). Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (1):11-22.
Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2003). Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):218 – 234.
Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela (2010). Two Kinds of We-Reasoning. Economics and Philosophy 26 (03):291-320.
Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale (2011). Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385 - 407.
Kay Mathiesen (2006). The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. Episteme 2 (3):161-175.
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