Dialectica 63 (2):209-218 (2009)
|Abstract||Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein's account. Section 3 raises a problem for Klein's account and suggests an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sections 5 to 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet the challenge. Section 8 presents my new proposal, which can meet the challenge. Section 9 concludes the discussion.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Kevin McCain (2012). The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
Jeffrey K. McDonough (2002). Hume's Account of Memory. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10 (1):71 – 87.
Ernest Sosa (1988). Methodology and Apt Belief. Synthese 74 (3):415 - 426.
Stephen P. Stich & Richard E. Nisbett (1980). Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning. Philosophy of Science 47 (2):188-202.
John Turri (2010). On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Why Justification Matters. In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
John Turri (2012). A Puzzle About Withholding. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):355-364.
Peter Klein (2007). How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
John Turri (2010). Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283.
Michael Bergmann (2007). Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification? Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
Added to index2009-06-16
Total downloads68 ( #15,773 of 722,857 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,384 of 722,857 )
How can I increase my downloads?