Believing For a Reason

Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397 (2011)
Abstract
This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. My thesis is that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes, and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (1986). Belief, Reason, and Inference. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):27-65.

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