Contingent A Priori Knowledge

Abstract
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary
Keywords A priori  Laurence BonJour  Saul Kripke
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    References found in this work BETA
    Robert Audi (1999). Self-Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):205-228.
    George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the a Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1–30.
    Michael Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.

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