David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 59 (October):433-60 (1950)
I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game." It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either "X is A and Y is B" or "X is B and Y is A." The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B. We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?"
|Keywords||Behavior Computer Extrasensory Perception Game Imitation Intelligence Learning Machine Physiology Science Thinking|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver (2011). Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches. [REVIEW] Synthese 183 (3):283-311.
Darren Abramson (2011). Philosophy of Mind Is (in Part) Philosophy of Computer Science. Minds and Machines 21 (2):203-219.
Noam Chomsky (2007). Biolinguistic Explorations: Design, Development, Evolution. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):1 – 21.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2009). Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):515-532.
Similar books and articles
Susan G. Sterrett (2000). Turing's Two Tests for Intelligence. Minds and Machines 10 (4):541-559.
Huma Shah & Kevin Warwick (2010). Testing Turing's Parallel-Paired Imitation Game. Kybernetes 39 (3).
Larry Hauser (2001). Look Who's Moving the Goal Posts Now. Minds and Machines 11 (1):41-51.
Dale Jacquette (1993). Who's Afraid of the Turing Test? Behavior and Philosophy 20 (21):63-74.
Keith Gunderson (1964). The Imitation Game. Mind 73 (April):234-45.
Saul Traiger (2000). Making the Right Identification in the Turing Test. Minds and Machines 10 (4):561-572.
E. Ronald & Moshe Sipper (2001). Intelligence is Not Enough: On the Socialization of Talking Machines. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 11 (4):567-576.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2000). Turing's Rules for the Imitation Game. Minds and Machines 10 (4):573-582.
Y. Sato & T. Ikegami (2004). Undecidability in the Imitation Game. Minds and Machines 14 (2):133-43.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads218 ( #2,143 of 1,098,981 )
Recent downloads (6 months)30 ( #3,351 of 1,098,981 )
How can I increase my downloads?