David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The principle that values cannot be derived from facts, though first explicitly formulated by David Hume, does not seem to be consistent with Hume's assertions that value becomes intelligible through experience, and that the will is determined by pleasure and pain. Moral reasoning involving pleasures and pains in the context of the peculiarities of human existence in society must be more complicated than reasoning involving ordinary, i.e. natural, pleasures and pains. Nevertheless, all pains and pleasures must be sensations. Hence Hume's moral philosophy becomes an example of an ethics in which facts, namely pleasures and pains, are related to values. However, many philosophers have argued that values must have a transcendental origin. Ludwig Wittgenstein's arguments concerning ethics and aesthetics constitute an interesting contemporary example of such transcendental conceptions of value. For Wittgenstein, the voice of conscience is God; the will can affect the subject at the limits of the world, and not things in the world; therefore, ethics must be transcendental (not expressible in the way facts in the world are). It seems that this attitude in ethics and aesthetics rules out any empirical discourse on values, which can hardly be called totally fruitless. An example of such discourse may even be one describable in Wittgensteinian terms: values can be defined through facts as modifications in the limits of the world, and through facts as things "in the world". If such descriptions are possible and expressible, a reference to a transcendental realm to account for the existence of conscience would become redundant
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ireneusz Ziemiński (2007). Death is Not an Event in Life: Ludwig Wittgenstein as a Transcendental Idealist. Idealistic Studies 37 (1):51-66.
Robert Sokolowski (2000). Transcendental Phenomenology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7:233-241.
Gary Banham (2010). Ethics Vindicated: Kant's Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):111-112.
Robert Stern (2007). Transcendental Arguments: A Plea for Modesty. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):143-161.
Ermanno Bencivenga (2007). Ethics Vindicated: Kant's Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse. Oxford University Press.
Maria Ossowska (1961). Remarks on the Ancient Distinction Between Bodily and Mental Pleasures. Inquiry 4 (1-4):123-127.
Ole Martin Moen (2013). The Unity and Commensurability of Pleasures and Pains. Philosophia 41 (2):527-543.
Sami Pihlström (2004). Recent Reinterpretations of the Transcendental. Inquiry 47 (3):289 – 314.
Sami Pihlstr (2004). Recent Reinterpretations of the Transcendental. Inquiry 47 (3):289 – 314.
Sami Pihlström (2004). Recent Reinterpretations of the Transcendental. Inquiry 47 (3):289-314.
Bennett W. Helm (2002). Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.
Anthony Brueckner (1983). Transcendental Arguments I. Noûs 17 (4):551-575.
Kieran Setiya (2004). Transcendental Idealism in the 'Aesthetic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):63–88.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads11 ( #213,207 of 1,725,444 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #211,098 of 1,725,444 )
How can I increase my downloads?