Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism

Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95 (2010)
In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy.
Keywords Contextualism  Invariantism  Speech acts  Keith DeRose  Assertion  Knowledge account
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2009-026
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Peter Pagin (2015). Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).

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