Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283 (2010)
We find two main contemporary arguments for the infinitist theory of epistemic justification ('infinitism' for short): the regress argument (Klein 1999, 2005) and the features argument (Fantl 2003). I've addressed the former elsewhere (Turri 2009a). Here I address the latter.Jeremy Fantl argues that infinitism outshines foundationalism because infinitism alone can explain two of epistemic justification's crucial features, namely, that it comes in degrees and can be complete. This paper demonstrates foundationalism's ample resources for explaining both features.Section II clarifies the debate's key terms. Section III recounts how infinitism explains the two crucial features. Section IV presents Fantl's argument ..
Keywords Foundationalism  Infinitism  Epistemic justification  Jeremy Fantl
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.2010.0006
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John Turri (2013). Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.

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