Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795 (2013)
|Abstract||I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections|
|Keywords||Infinitism Finite-mind objection Epistemic normativity Epistemic justification Peter Klein Adam Podlaskowski Joshua Smith|
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