David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53 (2006)
Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pre theoretical intuitions. we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is infact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28 - 53.
Shaun Nichols (2007). The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):260-270.
Eddy Nahmias (2011). Intuitions About Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing. In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press.
Eddy A. Nahmias (2006). Folk Fears About Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism Vs. Reductionism. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.
Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Kevin Timpe (2007). Source Incompatibilism and its Alternatives. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):284-299.
Ted Honderich (2002). Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Eddy Nahmias [ (2008). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Ariel Yadin (2004). Assuming Determinism, Free Will Can Only Be an Illusion: An Argument for Incompatibilism. Iyyun 53 (July):275-286.
Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer (2009). Natural Compatibilism Versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.
Boris Rähme (2013). Common Sense, Strict Incompatibilism, and Free Will. Philosophical Inquiries 1 (1):107-124.
Manuel Vargas (2010). The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave.
Joseph Keim Campbell (2006). Farewell to Direct Source Incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.
Derk Pereboom (2002). Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. 477-488.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads21 ( #82,873 of 1,102,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #18,364 of 1,102,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?