David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 47 (3):602-612 (2013)
What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Q’ and guaranteeing that Q? John Austin, Roderick Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars all agreed that there is some important connection, but disagreed over what exactly it was. In this paper I discuss each of their accounts and present a new one of my own. Drawing on speech-act theory and recent research on the epistemic norms of speech acts, I suggest that the relationship is this: by saying ‘I know that Q’, you represent yourself as having the authority to guarantee that Q.
|Keywords||John Austin Wifrid Sellars Roderick Chisholm assertion guaranteeing epistemic norms speech acts norms of assertion norms of guaranteeing epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
J. L. Austin (1975). How to Do Things with Words. Clarendon Press.
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York, Humanities Press.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969). On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright). Harper Torchbooks.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Knowledge and Implicatures. Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.
Matthew A. Benton & John Turri (2014). Iffy Predictions and Proper Expectations. Synthese 191 (8):1857-1866.
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