On the general argument against internalism

Synthese 170 (1):147 - 153 (2009)
Abstract
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections.
Keywords Epistemology  Epistemic justification  Internalism  Externalism  John Greco
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    Ram Neta & Duncan Pritchard (2007). McDowell and the New Evil Genius. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):381–396.

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