On the regress argument for infinitism

Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163 (2009)
This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.
Keywords Infinitism  Foundationalism  The regress argument  The epistemic regress problem  Peter Klein
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DOI 10.2307/40271162
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References found in this work BETA
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349-378.
Peter D. Klein (2005). Reply to Ginet. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell

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Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2013). Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.

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