On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification

I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.
Keywords virtue epistemology  basing relation  epistemic justification
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00331.x
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2011). The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.

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