David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 70 (1):35-39 (2010)
This paper refutes two important and influential views in one fell stroke. The first is G.E. Moore’s view that assertions of the form ‘Q but I don’t believe that Q’ are inherently “absurd.” The second is Gareth Evans’s view that justification to assert Q entails justification to assert that you believe Q. Both views run aground the possibility of being justified in accepting eliminativism about belief. A corollary is that a principle recently defended by John Williams is also false, namely, that justification to believe Q entails justification to believe that you believe Q.
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Citations of this work BETA
Aidan McGlynn (2013). Believing Things Unknown. Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Alexander R. Pruss (2012). Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546.
John N. Williams (2013). Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
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