Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||I consider David Eﬁrd and Tom Stoneham’s recent version of the subtraction argument for meta- physical nihilism, the view that there could have been no concrete objects at all. I argue that the two premises of their argument are only jointly acceptable if the quantiﬁers in one range over a diﬀerent set of objects from those which the quantiﬁers in the other range over, in which case the argument is invalid. So either the argument is invalid or we should not accept both its premises|
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