Strong and weak possibility

Philosophical Studies 125 (2):191 - 217 (2005)
The thesis of existentialism holds that if a proposition p exists and predicates something of an object a, then in any world where a does not exist, p does not exist either. If “possibly, p” entails “in some possible world, the proposition that p exists and is true,” then existentialism is prima facie incompatible with the truth of claims like “possibly, the Eiffel Tower does not exist.” In order to avoid this claim, a distinction between two kinds of world-indexed truth –and two associated kinds of modality –is needed. This paper embodies an attempt to develop a full account of just such a distinction.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    G. Aldo Antonelli (2000). Proto-Semantics for Positive Free Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):277-294.
    George Bealer (1993). Universals. Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5-32.
    Kit Fine (1980). First-Order Modal Theories. Studia Logica 39 (2-3):159 - 202.

    View all 10 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    18 ( #78,298 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.