Philosophical Studies 125 (2):191 - 217 (2005)
|Abstract||The thesis of existentialism holds that if a proposition p exists and predicates something of an object a, then in any world where a does not exist, p does not exist either. If “possibly, p” entails “in some possible world, the proposition that p exists and is true,” then existentialism is prima facie incompatible with the truth of claims like “possibly, the Eiffel Tower does not exist.” In order to avoid this claim, a distinction between two kinds of world-indexed truth –and two associated kinds of modality –is needed. This paper embodies an attempt to develop a full account of just such a distinction.|
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