Strong and weak possibility

Philosophical Studies 125 (2):191 - 217 (2005)
Abstract
The thesis of existentialism holds that if a proposition p exists and predicates something of an object a, then in any world where a does not exist, p does not exist either. If “possibly, p” entails “in some possible world, the proposition that p exists and is true,” then existentialism is prima facie incompatible with the truth of claims like “possibly, the Eiffel Tower does not exist.” In order to avoid this claim, a distinction between two kinds of world-indexed truth –and two associated kinds of modality –is needed. This paper embodies an attempt to develop a full account of just such a distinction.
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References found in this work BETA
G. Aldo Antonelli (2000). Proto-Semantics for Positive Free Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):277-294.
George Bealer (1993). Universals. Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5-32.
Kit Fine (1980). First-Order Modal Theories. Studia Logica 39 (2-3):159 - 202.

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