The supervenience argument

Florida Philosophical Review 4 (1):12-24 (2004)
Abstract
The Consequence Argument has long been a staple in the defense of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with causal determinism and that humans have free will. It is generally held that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the world—that is, that libertarian free will can be accommodated without the postulation of entities or events which neither are identical to nor supervene on something physical. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who support their view with the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview, since the Consequence Argument has a sister argument, which I call the Supervenience Argument, that cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the naturalistic worldview in question
Keywords Consequence  Free Will  Libertarianism  Metaphysics  Supervenience
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Brian P. McLaughlin (1994). Varieties of Supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Savellos, E.; Yalchin, O. (Eds.) Supervenience. Cambridge University Press. 16--59.
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