David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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University of Chicago Press (1994)
The concept of "practices"--whether of representation, of political or scientific traditions, or of organizational culture--is central to social theory. In this book, Stephen Turner presents the first analysis and critique of the idea of practice as it has developed in the various theoretical traditions of the social sciences and the humanities. Understood broadly as a tacit understanding "shared" by a group, the concept of a practice has a fatal difficulty, Turner argues: there is no plausible mechanism by which a "practice" is transmitted or reproduced. The historical uses of the concept, from Durkheim to Kripke's version of Wittgenstein, provide examples of the contortions that thinkers have been forced into by this problem, and show the ultimate implausibility of the idea. Turner's conclusion sketches a picture of what happens when we do without the notion of a shared practice, and how this bears on social theory and philosophy. It explains why social theory cannot get beyond the stage of constructing fuzzy analogies, and why the standard constructions of the contemporary philosophical problem of relativism depend upon this defective notion. This first book-length critique of practice theory is sure to stir discussion and controversy in a wide range of fields, from philosophy and science studies to sociology, anthropology, literary studies, and political and legal theory.
|Keywords||Practice (Philosophy Theory (Philosophy Tradition (Philosophy Tacit knowledge|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$17.12 new $25.38 used $70.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B831.3.T87 1994|
|ISBN(s)||0745613721 0226817377 9780226817378|
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Olen & Stephen Turner (2015). Durkheim, Sellars, and the Origins of Collective Intentionality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (5):954-975.
Omar Lizardo (2007). "Mirror Neurons," Collective Objects and the Problem of Transmission: Reconsidering Stephen Turner's Critique of Practice Theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (3):319–350.
Roberto Frega (2013). The Practice-Based Approach to Normativity of Frederick L. Will. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (4):483-511.
Michael Lynch (1999). Silence in Context: Ethnomethodology and Social Theory. [REVIEW] Human Studies 22 (2-4):211-233.
Nigel Pleasants (1996). Nothing is Concealed: De-Centring Tacit Knowledge and Rules From Social Theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):233–255.
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